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Is Brown the New Black?:1 American Muslims,
Inherent Propensity for Violence,2 and
America’s Racial History
Amara S. Chaudhry-Kravitz3

1. The title of this article, borrowed from the world of women’s fashion, may at first
seem to trivialize a complex, multi-faceted topic of sociological, legal, and political
significance. The author chose this title for stylistic reasons—though her thesis would
arguably have been more effectively articulated if the title was: “Is ‘Brown’ Actually a New
Shade of ‘Black’?” To clarify the use of color words in the title, the term “brown” is a shorthand expression commonly used by Muslims of varied racial and ethnic backgrounds and
divergent physical characteristics when referring to the equally diverse and pluralistic
American Muslim community. The term “black” in the title is a shorthand expression
frequently used by Americans of culturally diverse backgrounds to refer to African
Americans. In using this term, the author is fully aware that African Americans occupy a
unique position in American society as a result of a very particular cultural history and a
shared contemporary experience of the present-day legacy of that history. As stated below,
the author’s thesis rests upon her assertion that America’s racial history is largely dependent
upon a socially constructed white/non-white binary in which persons defined as “non-white”
are presumed to have an inherent propensity for violence. The author’s choice of tile derives
from the fact that the primary example of this racial binary in American culture, and the
presumptions of violence which apply thereto, in the United States is the black/white binary.
Though “brown” may not be “the new black,” the author asserts that “brown” is certainly a
shade of “non-white” and that it would be helpful for American society to dialogue about the
similarities and differences between these distinctions.
2. This article asserts that American Muslims are perceived as having an inherent
propensity for violence and theorizes that this perception is related to an American racial
history, which has a long history of perceiving “non-white” persons in this manner. It is this
perceived inherent propensity for violence that is referenced in the title for this article,
though the word “perceived” has been omitted for stylistic reasons.
3. Amara Chaudhry-Kravitz currently serves as legal director for the Council on
American-Islamic Relations Philadelphia Office (CAIR-Philadelphia). This article is her
second scholarly publication on the issue of legal definitions of race, the imposition of legal
racial classification categories, and the presumptions of violence that drive those definitions.
Her first article, “Lessons from Jim Crow: What Those Seeking Self-Determination for
Transgender Individuals Can Learn from American’s History with Racial Classification
Categories” was published during her years of service as legal director for an LGBT civil
rights practice, which immediately preceded her current position. See Amara S. Chaudhry,
Lessons from Jim Crow: What Those Seeking Self-Determination for Transgender
Individuals Can Learn from American’s History with Racial Classification Categories, 18
TEMP. POL. & CIV. RTS. L. REV. 505 (2009).
Ms. Chaudhry-Kravitz’s primary research interest focuses upon the ways in which
the American construction of “race” affects the extent to which American Muslim identity is
associated with a presumed inherent propensity for violence and criminal behavior. At
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I. Introduction
Good morning everybody.4 So as I was preparing to come here today,5
and I looked at the topic of “Where We Are, Where We’ve Been, Where
CAIR-Philadelphia, she focuses her legal work on cases that involve this association and
legal consequences of this association mostly in the context of national security and criminal
justice.
Prior to her career as a “civil rights” attorney, Ms. Chaudhry-Kravitz devoted the
majority of her career to the field of criminal justice. Immediately following her graduation
from Washington & Lee University School of Law, she worked for many years as an
assistant public defender and private criminal defense attorney in both West Virginia and
Pennsylvania. She has represented both juveniles and adults in state and federal court at
every level of proceeding, including jury trials and state and federal appellate work. She
also worked in the criminal justice field while an undergraduate at the University of Virginia
through internships with juvenile probation departments and a juvenile court-ordered
diversion program.
It is Ms. Chaudhry-Kravitz’s years working in the criminal justice field, and her
significant research into the historical legal construct of race, which prompted her to write
this article about race-based presumptions of violence.
4. This article stems from my remarks during a symposium at Washington & Lee
University School of Law. To capture the essence of those remarks, this article contains
language commonly associated with oral, rather than written, communication. I hope the
reader enjoys that stylistic device.
5. See supra note 4.
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We’re Going,”6 I decided that topic was too broad for me to discuss in
fifteen to twenty minutes, and I needed to narrow it a little bit for the
purpose of my remarks.
In an effort to narrow this topic, I will focus specifically on the
increasing criminalization7 of American Muslim identity post-9/118 and the
extent to which that criminalization is affected by a racial element or a
racial component. However, to remain true to the structure implied by this
panel’s title, I will structure my discussion within the “Where We Are,
Where We’ve Been, Where We’re Going” framework. For the “Where We
Are” discussion, I will demonstrate how American Muslim identity has
been “criminalized” post-9/11. I’ll then segue into the “Where We’ve Been
Discussion” in which I will analyze the criminalization of American
Muslim identity within the larger framework of America’s racial history.
Finally, in the “Where We’re Going” discussion, I will posit to you that
understanding the racial underpinnings of anti-Muslim bias in the United
States is necessary in order to effectively advocate for American Muslim
legal equality.
Throughout my remarks, my thesis is simple. I assert that the
criminalization of American Muslim group identity is a by-product of two
things: (1) the historical racialization of that identity as a “non-white” racial
category, and (2) the presumption, throughout American history, that “nonwhite” persons have an inherent propensity for violence and criminality.
II. Defining Our Terms
Before I delve too deeply into the substance of my remarks, I want to
take a moment to define my terms.
Throughout my remarks, I will use the phrase “American Muslim.”
When I use this term, I am referring to persons living in the United States
who either self-identify as “Muslim,” or who are identified by others as
“Muslim” regardless of whether the basis of that identity lies in internal
religious beliefs, externally articulated religious beliefs, and/or externally
6. This was the title of the first panel presentation at Washington & Lee University
School of Law’s Journal of Civil Rights and Social Justice’s 2013 Symposium. See
Symposium, Discrimination Against Muslim Americans in a Post-9/11 World, 20 WASH. &
LEE J. CIVIL RTS. & SOC. JUST. (2013).
7. The term “criminalization,” as it is used in this article, is described in Part II,
below.
8. Throughout this article, the term “9/11” will be used as a shorthand expression
referring to the tragic attacks on our nation that occurred on September 11, 2001.
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expressed religious practices. The term “Muslim” shall apply to any such
identified persons regardless of race, ethnicity, national origin, or country
of familial origin. The term also applies irrespective of an individual’s
country of citizenship, whether a person is an immigrant or American born,
and regardless of the duration of the individual’s, or the individual’s
family’s, history in the United States.
When I speak about “criminalization,” I’m speaking about explicit,
implicit, or even unconscious use of Muslim identity as either an ex ante9
basis for predicting an individual’s propensity for violence or likelihood to
engage in criminal behavior10 in the future, or as an ex post facto11 basis for
determining the likelihood that an individual has engaged in violence and/or
criminal behavior in the past or present.12

9. Ex ante is a Latin phrase meaning “before the event.”
10. The “criminal behavior” to which I am referring includes, but is not limited to, the
terrorism crimes outlined in Title 18, Chapter 113B, of the United States Code, though there
is an ongoing debate as to whether the federal criminal justice system is the appropriate
forum to address “terrorism” and “terroristic acts” and whether “terrorism” should be
considered as a “criminal act” or an “act of war.” While I acknowledge the validity of that
debate, the debate itself is largely beyond the scope of this article. Instead, this article
focuses only upon an explicit or implied presumption of an inherent propensity for violence,
and the term “criminalization” is being used as a short-hand express for that presumption.
11. Ex post facto is a Latin phrase meaning “after the event.” Though this phrase is
most commonly used to describe a law that retroactively criminalizes previously
noncriminal actions, this article uses the term in a more literal context.
12. My definition of the term “criminalization” was somewhat inspired by language
used by William M. Carter, Jr., to describe “racial profiling.” See A Thirteenth Amendment
Framework for Combating Racial Profiling, 39 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 17 (Winter, 2004)
(“Racial profiling, or the use of race as an ex ante basis for criminal suspicion.”). At Note
21, Dean Carter acknowledges that “racial profiling” may apply to other societal groups
other than African Americans, but, as his article discusses racial profiling as an “incident [ ]
or badge [ ] of slavery” under the Thirteenth Amendment; he does not attempt to analyze the
extent to which “racial profiling” applies to other societal groups.
There is a reason why I avoided the term “racial profiling” in this article. The
term “racial profiling,” by its own terms, applies only to “profiling” based upon “race.” As
discussed in Part V of this article, many civil rights advocates, both internal and external to
the American Muslim community, have used the term “racial profiling” to describe the
practice of using American Muslim identity as an ex ante basis for criminal suspicion.
While the use of the term “profiling” in this way seems to coincide with Dean Carter’s
definition of “racial profiling,” one question remains: Is profiling on the basis of “Muslim”
identity a form of profiling on the basis of a “racial” identity? This is the central question
posed by this article. As the classification of “Muslim” identity as a “racial” identity is the
central issue being examined herein, I thought it inappropriate to use the term “racial
profiling” (which seemingly concludes, without examination, that “Muslim” identity has
been socially construed as a “racial” identity).
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When I speak of the “racialization,” I am referring to the extent to
which American Muslim identity is construed, and has been historically
construed, as a racial category. As I describe below in Part III, below, I
believe that it is undisputed that American Muslims have a socially
constructed group identity, and this group identity has been criminalized.
The question, which is examined by this article, is whether that socially
constructed group identity is, and should be understood as, a racial identity.
In answering this question, I will argue that American Muslim should be
construed as a racial identity, I will describe how Muslim identity has been
socially constructed as a “non-white” racial identity13 in a nation which has
a long history of assuming that persons who belong to populations
consisting mostly of individuals with black or brown skin have a higher
propensity for violence and criminality.14 Therefore, considering American
Muslim identity in the context of American racial history and the historical
13. I am not the first writer to comment upon the “racialization” of “Muslim” identity.
However, I want to clarify my position on this topic in relation to other authors.
Some scholars, particularly those in the field of Asian critical race studies, have
referred to this racialization process as similar to, and perhaps a continuation of, the historic
“otherization” or “alienation” of Asian American identity, in which persons belonging to
that socially constructed racial group are seen as “perpetual others” or “perpetual foreigners”
in American society. These theories of the “otherization” or “alienation” of American
Muslim identity assume that “Muslims,” as a racial category, are external to the classic
black/white racial binary which has historically defined American society, including those
Muslims who, but for their Muslim identity, would otherwise be defined racially as either
“black” or “white.”
This article does not discuss the “racialization” of American Muslim identity in
quite the same way. Instead, I adopt an approach more similar to that taken by Ian Haney
Lopez. In so doing, I would argue that Haney suggests a white/non-white racial binary
which is similar to the black/white racial binary most commonly discussed in the field of
critical race studies and the legal construction of race. See generally IAN HANEY LOPEZ,
WHITE BY LAW: THE LEGAL CONSTRUCTION OF RACE (1996) (positing that a white racial
identity has been significant in American history and that the social and legal position of
persons of non-white racial identities results from their exclusion from the socially desirable
white racial group).
Borrowing from Haney’s white/non-white dichotomy, this article suggests that
American Muslims have been “racialized” within, and not external to, America’s traditional
racial binaries. Furthermore, I assert that American Muslim identity has been “criminalized”
precisely because American Muslims are being socially construed as belonging to a racial
category which has long been perceived as having an inherent propensity for violence and
criminality.
14. See Carter, supra note 12, at 56–60 (discussing the extent to which non-white
racial identity is associated with an inherent propensity for violence and criminality and
documenting the extent to which this criminalization process has applied to other racial
groups); see also Chaudhry, supra note 3, at 506–07 (describing the history of
criminalization of the African American racial identity).
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criminalization of non-white racial identity, I argue that American Muslims
have been criminalized on the basis of their group identity precisely
because their group identity has been racialized as a “non-white” racial
identity.
In order to understand the concept I label as “racialization,” it is
necessary to distinguish between anti-Muslim bias (specifically, the
criminalization of American Muslim identity), which is, in effect, a
racialized bias, and anti-Muslim bias, which is a religious bias. When I
refer to a racialized bias, I refer to a belief (possibly, unstated or even
unconscious) that American Muslims have an inherent propensity for
violence as an intrinsic and organic part of their very being. This
propensity is inborn, immutable, and cannot be removed by converting to
another religious faith or otherwise altering one’s religious beliefs or
practices. This racialized bias against American Muslims should be
understood to be separate and distinct from a belief (which, again, may be
unstated or even unconscious) that Muslims’ belief system encourages
violence and that a Muslim can be “cured,” as it were, from his propensity
for violence by converting to another faith or otherwise altering his
religious beliefs.15 As one scholar phrases it, “In a religious conflict, it is
not who you are but what you believe that is important. Under a racist
regime, there is no escape from who you are…or are perceived to be.”16
III. Where We Are: Post-9/11 Criminalization of American Muslim Identity
A. In a Post-9/11 World, American Muslim Identity Has Been Criminalized
So, beginning by speaking about where we are now, I’m going to
assert an almost indisputable fact—that American Muslim identity has been
criminalized post-9/11. In other words, American Muslims have been
socially constructed to have a shared group identity, and persons associated
with that socially constructed group identity are presumed to have an
inherent inclination toward violent behavior. As described below, I assert
that there have been a multitude of post-9/11 governmental policies enacted

15. See infra Part IV, for an analysis of this concept as applied to another, nonMuslim, people with a socially constructed group identity that contains both religious and
racial components.
16. Moustafa Bayoumi, Racing Religion, in AMERICAN STUDIES: AN ANTHOLOGY 99,
103 (Janice A. Radway, Kevin Gaines, Barry Shank & Penny Von Eschen eds., 2009).
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post-9/11 which appear to be premised upon this presumption of
criminality.17
We see examples of this apparent presumption of criminality
everywhere. We begin with FBI surveillance of mosques.18 We have also
seen federal prosecutorial targeting of religious and civic organizations,
such as CAIR19 and other national organizations, including Islamic
17. The term “presumption of criminality” shall be understood herein to refer to a
presumption of criminal suspicion. See Carter, supra note 12, at 40 (discussing the use of
racial factors by police as a means by which to focus their search for a criminal suspect).
18. Both the American Civil Liberties Union of Southern California (ACLU-So. Cal.)
and the Council on American-Islamic Relations of Greater Los Angeles (CAIR-LA) have
heavily documented FBI surveillance of mosques and Islamic centers. See GREATER LOS
ANGELES AREA CHAPTER, COUNCIL ON AMERICAN-ISLAMIC RELATIONS (2009) available at
http://ca.cair.com/download.php?f=/downloads/CAIR_FBI_Abuses_Annotated_Source_List
--Articles_and_Cases.pdf.
In February 2011, the ACLU-So. Cal. and CAIR-LA filed a lawsuit against the
FBI alleging that FBI actions—specifically, using undercover agents to enter mosques to
collect personal information, and information about “constitutionally protected” religious
practices—violated the Establishment and Free Exercise Clauses of the First Amendment, as
well as other provisions of the United States Constitution. See Fazaga v. F.B.I, 884 F. Supp.
2d 1022 (C.D. Ca. 2012).
19. See United States v. Holy Land Found. for Relief & Dev., CRIM.A.3:04-CR-240G, 2007 WL 1498813 (N.D. Tex. 2007). The Council on American-Islamic Relations, a
nationwide non-profit civil rights organization for which the author of this article works, is
known by the acronym “CAIR.” On May 29, 2007, the United States Attorney’s Office for
the Northern District of Texas filed, in a criminal containing a sealed indictment, a document
titled “Government’s Trial Brief” which included an “Attachment A” which listed the names
of numerous American Muslim organizations, including CAIR and 245 others as “coconspirators” in a case in which they were never indicted. See The Investigative Project on
Terrorism, http://www.investigativeproject; see also The Investigative Project on Terrorism:
Attachment A org/documents/case_docs/423.pdf. Because the persons and organizations
named on this list were never formally indicted, they became known simply as “unindicted
co-conspirators” (or, “UCC,” as a short-hand reference). Due to political pressure (in which
media attention was used to apply this pressure), Attorney General Eric Holder was asked to
review the Holy Land Foundation case file to see if there was sufficient legal or factual basis
to seek an indictment against these alleged “co-conspirators.” Notably, Mr. Holder’s
predecessors in President Bush’s Justice Department had initially considered seeking such
indictments but ultimately decided otherwise. See Bush Justice Department Nixed CAIR
Indictment in 2004, POLITICO.COM, http://www.politico.com//blogs/joshgerstein/0411/Source
_Bush_Justice_Department_nixed_CAIR_indictment_in_2004.html.
Attorney
General
Holder agreed to such a review and released a public statement indicating that, “looking at
the facts and law,” the Justice Department under his direction would not reverse the decision
of the previous administration. Holder DOJ Nixed CAIR Leaders Prosecution,
POLITICO.COM, http://www.politico.com//blogs/joshgerstein/0411/Holder_DOJ_nixed_CAIR
_leaders_prosecution.html. On July 1, 2009, a district court judge in northern Texas
officially sealed both the “Government’s Trial Brief” and its “Attachment A” because
“[n]either CAIR nor the other unindicted co-conspirators have been charged with a crime
and they have [had] no judicial forum in which to defend against the accusation.” Criminal
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charities.20 But the federal government is not the only one keeping its eye
on the Muslim community. For example, we know that the NYPD has
conducted surveillance from Pennsylvania to Connecticut, and specifically
it has targeted both mosques and Muslim student associations at
universities.21 We see the criminalization of American Muslim identity at
airports when DHS and TSA employees target “Muslim-looking”
individuals, or individuals with “Muslim-sounding” names for secondary
screenings based upon an unspoken presumption that American Muslims
have an inherent propensity to engage in acts of violence against the United

Case No. 3:04-cr-00240-P, Docket Entry No. 1356, at p.10 of 20 (N.D. Tex.) (publicly
available at: http://www.scribd.com/doc/43380629/2009-order-on-Holy-Land-Foundationunindicted-coconspirator-list). The court further noted that “the release of the List subjected
CAIR to annoyance, ridicule, scorn, and loss of reputation in the community” and that the
Government had a multitude of options available to it that it did not release the list out of
necessity. Id. at pp. 10–11 of 20. Later, in 2010, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth
Circuit ruled in favor of an un-indicted co-conspirator who had filed a civil rights lawsuit
against the Department of Justice. In ruling against the DOJ, the court found that the public
release of the names of these so-called “unindicted co-conspirators” resulted in a violation of
the named parties’ due process rights (i.e., an opportunity to defend themselves against
allegations of criminal impropriety).
20. See id.; see also Steve C. Posner, Posner on United States v. Holy Land
Foundation for Relief and Development, 2008 EMERGING ISSUES 891 (2007); Holy Land
Found. for Relief & Dev. v. Ashcroft, 333 F.3d 156 (D.C. Cir. 2003).
21. See Highlights of AP's Pulitzer Prize-winning probe into NYPD intelligence
operations, AP.ORG http://www.ap.org/media-center/nypd/investigation (last visited Nov.
27, 2013).
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States or its citizens.22 We have also seen anti-Muslim trainings by law
enforcement23 in the United States military.24
B. Is This Criminalization a Result of a “Racialization” of American
Muslim Identity?
So now let’s analyze some of the possible explanations for the
criminalization I just described. Okay, so if American Muslims have a
socially constructed group identity, and are presumed to have a propensity
for violence and criminal behavior on the basis of that group identity, why
does this presumption exist? What, specifically, about that group identity
leads to the presumption of criminality? And, as I suggest, is this
presumption predicated upon a socially constructed definition of “race,” or
is it predicated upon something else? Well let’s think critically about some
of the contemporary examples of this criminalization, described in Subpart
22. “Muslim profiling” at airports is one of the most commonly discussed examples of
what I define here as the increasing criminalization of American Muslim identity. However,
it is unclear how widespread this phenomenon truly is. Intake data from “the nation’s largest
Muslim civil rights organization,” the Council on American-Islamic Relations (CAIR)
shows that only 1 percent of its intake calls are comprised of persons who seek CAIR’s legal
assistance due to perceived “Muslim profiling” at airports. Though intake data can be
affected by a multitude of factors, this data has remained constant for several years and
consistent, as an average, across CAIR chapters nationwide. See COUNCIL ON AMERICANISLAMIC RELATIONS, THE STATUS OF MUSLIM CIVIL RIGHTS IN THE UNITED STATES 2009:
SEEKING FULL INCLUSION, 11 (2009), available at https://www.cair.com/images/pdf/CAIR2009-Civil-Rights-Report.pdf (reporting that 2.71 percent of civil rights cases involving
Muslim-Americans arose from incidents that occurred in airports).
Despite this author’s uncertainty regarding the prevalence of this practice, the
existence and prevalence of “airport profiling” of American Muslims has become a mainstay
of scholarship discussing the civil rights of Americans in the post-9/11 era. See Leti Volpp,
The Citizen and the Terrorist, 49 UCLA L. REV. 1575, 1580 and nn. 13–14 (2002)
(examining the legitimacy of racial profiling and the relationship between citizenship, nation
and identity).
23. See SOUTHERN POVERTY LAW CENTER INTELLIGENCE REPORT, FBI Used Training
Materials from Anti-Muslim Extremists, Issue No. 144 (2011), available at
http://www.splcenter.org/get-informed/intelligence-report/browse-all-issues/2011/winter/fbiused-training-materials-from-anti; see also Muslim Public Affairs Counsel, Enough is
Enough: The anti-Muslim Training Tide Must Turn, (May 18, 2012) available at
http://www.mpac.org/programs/government-relations/dc-news-and-views/enough-isenough-the-anti-muslim-training-tide-must-turn.php (providing a more extensive discussion
of anti-Muslim training materials used by the United States military, the Department of
Justice, the Federal Bureau of Investigation and the New York Police Department).
24. See Spencer Ackerman, FBI Teaches Agents: ‘Mainstream’ Muslims are ‘Violent,
Radical’, WIRED.COM (Sept. 14, 2011), available at http://www.wired.com/dangerroom/
2011/09/fbi-muslims-radical/all/1 (documenting the anti-Muslim training materials by the
United States military).
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A above, and let’s think about whether these examples of criminalization
appear to be motivated by “race” or by some other factor.
When we speak about profiling at airports and borders, we are
normally talking about individuals who are stopped, pulled aside, maybe
even subjected to additional questioning or screening simply because of
things such as their name or their physical appearance (i.e., the so-called
“Muslim looking” people).25 In that case, well, it sure looks like a
racialized practice, right?
For example, let’s say you go to an airport and your name is something
along the lines of “Abdul Hakim Mohammed Jamal.” Well, now, despite
your name, it’s entirely possible that you never were a Muslim, or that you
were formerly a Muslim but you converted to a non-Muslim faith well in
advance of going to the airport on that date. However, if your name is still
Abdul Hakim Mohammed Jamal, and/or you look like a guy who could be
named Abdul Hakim Mohammed Jamal, well then you know to get to the
airport early because you anticipate difficulty getting through security.
Right? That’s what I’m saying. . . . I’m just saying, you know, that that’s
still a situation.26 And I know this from experience. I had a client, a
gentleman who was stopped at the US–Canadian border, and the sole
questions the Customs and Border Patrol (CBP) asked him were “You—
what’s your name?” Now, I can’t remember if his name was Muhammad
Jamaal or Jamaal Muhammad, but let’s just say he looked like a guy who
could have one of those names—so he was asked that particular question
which led to a completely predictable follow-up question. The client gave
his name, and he was asked, “Where are you from?” Of course, he said
“Norristown, PA” which completely agitated the CBP agent who
responded, “You know what I mean—where are you from originally.” The
client disclosed his country of national origin, a well-known Muslimmajority nation,27 and all he heard was “Okay, come over here” before he
was handcuffed and detained just shy of forty-eight hours (and people who
practice criminal law know that forty-eight hours used to mean something
in that context). Another client of mine had the exact same experience—
even though the nation he disclosed was his family’s country of origin, and
he was a native-born American citizen.
25. See Muneer Ahmad, A Rage Shared by Law: Post-September 11 Racial Violence
as Crimes of Passion, 92 CALIF. L. REV. 1259, 1261 (2004) (arguing that a new post-9/11
racial identity has formed which includes all “Muslim-looking” people).
26. See supra notes 4–5.
27. A nation generally known to the American population as having a large Muslim
majority population.
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In situations such as the one we just described, we’re looking at
discrimination on the basis of what we call immutable characteristics. My
client was singled out for a certain line of questioning—one which would
predictably disclose information which would later be used to deprive him
of his liberty—based upon characteristics he could not change. He could
not change the physical appearance, which prompted the initial questioning.
He also could not do anything to alter the location of his birth, and
truthfully disclosing that information caused suspicion that he might
possess a criminal intent (or has already engaged in criminal behavior) and
resulted detention. So situations such as the one I just described appear to
criminalize Muslim identity on the basis of national origin, race, or
ethnicity—all of which are immutable characteristics.
Even presumptions which, at first, appear to be based on non-racial
factors, can, in fact, be motivated by social constructs of “race.” For
example, last night, as I was looking over some anti-Muslim training
materials used by the United States military,28 I noticed something that I
had not previously seen before. Now, most anti-Muslim training materials,
whether coming from the military or law enforcement, focus almost entirely
upon religious beliefs and practices, and these slides were no different.
However, I was struck by the constant reference to “moderate” (in quotes)
Muslims in these Power Point slides. Actually, every mention of
“moderate” Muslims contained the word “moderate” in quotation marks, as
if to suggest that “moderate” Muslims (however the term “moderate” be
defined) do not exist. The slides continue to expand upon this point,
indicating that all persons with a Muslim identity share an inherent
sympathy for terrorism committed in the name of Islam, regardless of that
person’s religious practices or expressed religious beliefs.29 If, as these
slides suggest, a Muslim’s propensity of violence is not dependent upon his
religious beliefs or practices, then what is this inherent propensity
dependent upon? What aspect of his “Muslim” identity is the relevant
factor? I would suggest the individual’s association with the Muslim
“race”—in other words, the racialization of his Muslim identity—that is the
basis for presuming his inherent propensity for violence.
However, it is not always that simple. In some situations, the
presumptions of criminality associated with American Muslim identity
28. See Lt. Col. Matthew A. Dooley, Power Point Presentation: “So What Can We
Do?” A Counter-Jihad Op Design Model, 23 (2011), available at http://www.wired.com/
images_blogs/dangerroom/2012/05/dooley_counter_jihad_op_design_v11.pdf (last visited
Oct. 5, 2013).
29. Id. at 28.
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appear to be based, at least in part, upon completely mutable characteristics
such as religious beliefs or religious behavior. However, even in those
situations, the initial interest in the individual is, most often, still reliant
upon a racialized presumption that all Muslims have an inherent propensity
for violence. Let’s take, for example, the FBI’s surveillance of mosque
attendees.30 In my own legal practice, I have seen the FBI take a particular
interest in American Muslims who publicly engage in certain religious
practices commonly associated with the devout. For example, the FBI has
specifically targeted American Muslims who have been observed as
frequent mosque attendees, those who engage in proselytizing of the faith,
and those who regularly attend community meetings to discuss the faith.
Furthermore, when American Muslims have agreed to be interviewed by
the FBI in a “national security” matter, they almost always are questioned
about their specific religious beliefs and practices. They are asked about
whether they pray at home, whether they pray five times a day, and whether
they fast during Ramadan. In this scenario, the racialized Muslim identity
still targets American Muslims for close scrutiny, but now there is no
longer a presumption of an inherent propensity for violence and criminality.
Instead, the determination as to whether someone has a propensity for
violence and criminality is based upon that person’s beliefs or behaviors.
IV. Where We’ve Been: Legal Constructs, and Consequences, of Race in
America and the Historical Racialization of American Muslim Identity31
So we know that this is where we are now: American Muslims have
been “criminalized,” and it appears as though the underlying predicate of
that criminalization rests both in some sort of socially constructed
“racialized” American Muslim group identity and on the basis of wholly
mutable characteristics such as individualized beliefs and behavior.
Now, I want to step back a minute to discuss “Where We’ve Been.”
If, as I suggest, the criminalization of American Muslim identity post-9/11
is based, at least to some extent, upon socially constructed notions of
30. Bayoumi, supra note 16.
31. As detailed in the notes contained in this article, my research into the relevant case
law on this issue owes a huge debt to Moustafa Bayoumi’s seminal article documenting the
extent to which American Muslim identity was legally construed as a non-white racial
identity and the legal consequences of these judicial determinations regarding the “race” of
“American Muslims” (as I have defined those persons in Part II, above). To be candid,
almost all scholars who have written about the “racialization” of American Muslim identity
owe a huge debt to Professor Bayoumi’s detailed and deliberate research.
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“race,” then there are new questions to discuss. First, can a religious
identity be “racialized,” or are racial and religious identities two separate
social constructs? Second, if religious identity can be “racialized,” what is
the evidence that American Muslim identity has been “racialized?”
I will answer these questions concurrently, beginning with cases that
demonstrate that American Muslim identity, a seemingly religious identity,
has been historically construed as a non-white racial identity as a matter of
law. The very existence of this body of case law, and the language
contained therein, is evidence that a religious identity can be “racialized”
and, by way of an example, that Muslim religious identity has been so
racialized.
The greatest evidence of this racialization of American Muslims as
“non-white” is contained in cases which are known as the “racial
prerequisite cases.” These are cases that were decided during the time
period beginning in 1790 and ending in 1952 in which the Naturalization
Act limited American citizenship to what was called “free white persons,”32
but without defining exactly who would be included in this particular racial
category. The Act was later broadened in 1870 to include persons of
“African nativity” and persons of “African descent”33 and again in 1940 to
include “races indigenous to the Western Hemisphere.”34 During this time
period, any persons who immigrated to the United States who did not
qualify as either a “free white person,” a person belonging to a race
“indigenous to the Western Hemisphere,” or a person of “African nativity”
or “African descent” could lawfully enter the United States but could not be
naturalized as a citizen of the United States.35 In the racial prerequisite
32. See Bayoumi, supra note 16, at 99. Bayoumi’s article is considered to be the
seminal publication on the topic of the racialization of the Islamic faith. It has been
reprinted in numerous publications. For the purposes of this article, the author will cite to
page numbers as they appear in the volume of American Studies upon which she principally
relied while preparing this article for publication.
33. See Naturalization Act of 1870, 16 Stat. 254, 256 (1870).
34. See Naturalization Act of 1940, Pub. L No. 853, 54 Stat. 1137, 1140 (1940).
35. As a historical point, I want to mention the Immigration Act of 1917, which
created what it called the “Asiatic Barred Zone” (and is consequently also known as the
“Asian Barred Zone” Act), which barred immigration from the continent of Asia and “[a]ny
country not owned by the U.S. adjacent to the continent of Asia.” Pub. L. No. 301, 39 Stat.
874, 881 (1917). Presumably, this new Act would have had a profound effect upon
immigration from the Muslim-majority world (much of which is located within the continent
of Asia or adjacent thereto). As a matter of law, any person who sought to immigrate to the
United States from a nation located within the barred zone would not merely be deprived of
the possibility of becoming a naturalized citizen, he would also be banned from any lawful
entry into the United States. Despite this historical point, however, this article discusses a
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cases, an immigrant filed an application for citizenship and a federal court,
when considering whether to grant that decision, was faced with the
question of deciding whether the immigrant could lawfully claim to be
“free white persons” and, therefore, eligible to become a citizen under the
Naturalization Act.
Specifically, I want to discuss some racial prerequisite cases, which
involve petitioners from the Muslim-majority world, or other nations within
the Greater Middle East. The purpose of this discussion is to demonstrate
the extent to which religious identity or affiliation was historically used, in
the context of the racial prerequisite cases, by federal courts to make a legal
determination as to race.
The first case I want to talk about is In re Hassan, which arose out of
the Eastern District of Michigan in 1942.36 In that case, a Yemeni Muslim
man was petitioning a federal district court to be naturalized as a citizen of
the United States.37 As he petitioned the court, Mr. Hassan employed a
tactic which was common among petitioners in the racial prerequisite
cases38—he asserted that he was a member of the “white race” due to the
fact that he belonged to an ethnic group which “are remote descendants of
and therefore members of the Caucasian or white race. . . .”39 Mr. Hassan
also seemed to assume that his physical appearance—which, as the court
noted in its decision, included an “extremely dark complexion”40—would
pose an obstacle to his ability to claim to be a member of the “white” race
because he came to court “armed with affidavits”41 stating that his coloring
‘is typical of the majority of Arabians [sic] from the region from which he

number of racial prerequisite cases, which were decided during the time period when the
Asiatic Barred Zone Act was in effect. Each of the cases cited and discussed herein involve
petitions for naturalization (and not removal or deportation proceedings). Due to the
procedural posture of these cases, and the legal issues contained therein, it can be concluded
that the petitioners in each of these cases entered the United States lawfully and, therefore,
their inclusion in the “white” race was only relevant, as a legal matter, to their ability to be
naturalized as citizens of the United States.
36. In re Hassan, 48 F. Supp. 843 (E.D. Mich. 1942).
37. Bayoumi, supra note 16, at 99.
38. Based upon the author’s review of multiple racial prerequisite cases, including, but
not limited to: cases cited herein, the case of U.S. v. Thind, 261 U.S. 204 (1923), the cases
cited in Bayoumi’ s article Racing Religion and other similar scholarly works.
39. Hassan, 48 F. Supp. at 846.
40. Id. at 844.
41. Bayoumi, supra note 16, at 100.
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comes, which [in] fact is attributed to the intense heat and the blazing sun
of that area.”42
The court ultimately rejected Mr. Hassan’s assertion that he was a
“free white person” and denied his petition for naturalization. However, the
court did not base its denial upon either Mr. Hassan’s stated ancestry (as a
remote descendant of the Caucasian or white race) or upon his physical
appearance (including the “extremely dark complexion”).43 Instead, the
court denied Mr. Hassan’s petition because he came from a region of the
world where Islam was being practiced. The court specifically gave the
following reason for its decision: “Apart from the dark-skin of the Arabs, it
is well-known that they are a part of the Mohammedan44 [sic] world and
that a wide gulf separates their culture from that of the predominately
Christian peoples of Europe.”45
This language in Hassan raises several interesting points. First, and
most obviously, the court uses Mr. Hassan’s Muslim identity as a basis for
defining his race as non-white. Second, the court indicates that “Christian”
identity is necessary to be considered a “free white person” person eligible
for citizenship. Third, and most intriguingly, the court seems to base its
decision not on Mr. Hassan’s individual religious identity, but upon the
majority religion in the region of the world from which Mr. Hassan
emigrated. This is an example of the racialization of Muslim identity—the
notion that this particular religious identity applies to all persons who
possess the same set of immutable characteristics, such as a shared
ethnicity, regardless of any individual’s particular religious beliefs. Indeed,
the court’s language fails to identify whether Mr. Hassan, as an individual,
identifies as “Muslim” or practices the Islamic faith. Instead, the court only
identifies Mr. Hassan as belonging to an ethnic group, “Arab,” which is
associated with the Muslim-majority world. Mr. Hassan is deemed nonwhite because his ethnicity, an immutable characteristic, imparts upon him
a Muslim identity. Based upon this language, it would appear that the
42. In re Hassan, 48 F. Supp. 843, 845 (E.D. Mich. 1942).
43. Id.
44. The term “Mohammedan” is an archaic term and generally considered to be a
pejorative term used to describe Muslims (i.e., practitioners of the Islamic faith). The term
is considered pejorative to Muslims who feel that it both misstates and misunderstands the
Islamic religion, by suggesting that Muslims’ reverence for the Prophet Mohammed is akin
to worship of a deity other than “the God of Abraham,” and attempts to distinguish the
Islamic faith from other Abrahamic faith traditions. Nonetheless, the term was commonly
used during certain periods in United States history. The term is contained herein in
quotations from legal documents that were written during those time periods.
45. Hassan, 48 F. Supp. at 845.
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judge construed Muslim identity in such a racialized manner that the
religious beliefs and practices of Mr. Hassan were legally irrelevant.
This question of whether a person’s individual religious beliefs affect
his racial identity is commonly repeated in the racial prerequisite cases and
produce conflicting results. In the case of In re Ellis,46 a Syrian immigrant
was allowed to obtain citizenship as a free white person because, as the
court noted, “he was reared a Catholic and is still of that faith.”47 In another
case involving a Syrian immigrant, Ex parte Shahid,48 the court denies the
petitioner’s citizenship application on grounds other than the petitioner’s
race, but articulates his discomfort with the notion that the definition of
“free white persons” should exclude a consideration of religious identity.49
Limiting the definition of “free white persons” solely to “Europeans,” the
judge explained, that it would be troubling since such a definition “would
exclude persons coming from the very cradle of the Jewish and Christian
religions.”50 Though the judge in Shahid never clarified whether he
believed that an individual’s religious beliefs or practices, or whether the
relevant factor was the predominate religion in a petitioner’s country of
origin, the judge nonetheless clearly opines that religion should be a
consideration when legally defining an individual’s race.
More interesting generally are the cases involving Armenian51
immigrants during this time period. For example, in United States v.
Cartozian,52 a federal district court in Oregon granted an Armenian
immigrant’s citizenship petition on the stated belief that Armenians, on
account of their religion, could be defined as free white persons eligible for
citizenship.53 Specifically, the court opined, “[a]lthough the Armenian
province is within the confines of the Turkish empire, being in Asia Minor,
the people thereof have always held themselves aloof from the Turks, the
Kurds, and allied peoples, principally, it might be said, on account of their
46. In re Ellis, 179 F. 1002 (D. Or. 1910).
47. Id.
48. Ex parte Shahid, 205 F. 812 (E.D.S.C. 1913).
49. Bayoumi, supra note 16, at 105.
50. Shahid, 205 F. at 816.
51. See Armenia, WIKIPEDIA.ORG, (Oct. 11, 2013, 6:27 PM), http://en.wikipedia.org/
wiki/Armenia (noting the predominance of Christianity in Armenia, as well as providing
general information about Armenia); see also Greater Middle East, WIKIPEDIA.ORG (Oct. 11,
2013, 6:30 PM), http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Greater_Middle_East (identifying Armenia as
a part of the Greater Middle East).
52. United States v. Cartozian, 6 F.2d 919 (D. Or. 1925).
53. See Bayoumi, supra note 16, at 106 (briefly discussing Cartozian).
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religion.”54 In other words, Christianity makes the Armenians more
culturally aligned with Europeans and this religious commonality makes the
Armenians “white.” In another naturalization case involving an Armenian
petition, In re Halladjian,55 a federal district court sitting in Massachusetts
opined:
“Race . . . is not an easy working test of white color…. In the warfare
which has raged since the beginning of history about the eastern
Mediterranean between Europeans and Asiatics, the Armenians have
generally. . . been found on the European side…. By reason of their
Christianity, they generally ranged themselves against the Persian fireworshippers, and against the Mohammedans.”56

As in Cartozian, the court in Halladijan once again concluded that
Armenians, due to the historic Christianity of their nation, are culturally
aligned with Europeans and, therefore, their collective historic Christianity
makes them, as a people, “white.” Once again, the court is unclear whether
an individual’s religious identity is legally relevant but, once again, the
court clearly articulates a racialized view that the historical majority
religion of a people determines that group’s racial identity.
This racialization of a religious identity is not unique to Muslims or to
the United States. Consider, for example, the discourse and dialogue that
surrounds Jewish identity and the definition thereof. Or, perhaps more
appropriately, consider the way in which non-Jews have defined Jewish
identity during certain periods of history. Above, I referenced two
interesting points raised by the first case I discuss in this subpart, In re
Hassan. However, the third point raised by the Hassan decision is,
perhaps, the most intriguing. The Hassan decision was entered in 1942.
Now, let us think about what was happening in world history in 1942 and
whether there was any other part of the world, outside of the United States,
in which a federal government was determining “whiteness” (or inclusion
in the “Aryan,” “European,” or “Caucasian” race) on the basis of religion?
Right? Now, keeping this concept of world history in mind, let’s actually
think about the Third Reich for a moment. Remember that Jewish identity
was often determined by ancestry. If you were born a Jew you were a Jew.
You could try to convert your way out of it, you were still a Jew. As noted
by one scholar, “anti-Semitism became racism when the belief took hold
that Jews were intrinsically and organically evil rather than merely having
54.
55.
56.

Cartozian, 6 F.2d at 921.
In re Halladjian 174 F. 834 (C. C. D. Mass. 1909).
Id. at 840–41.
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false beliefs and wrong dispositions.”57 In other words, religious bias
predicated upon actual or perceived58 religious beliefs and practices is not
racism, as a person is able avoid this bias by changing their religious beliefs
and practices. However, “religious” bias which relies upon a (stated,
unstated, or even unconscious) belief that persons belonging to a certain
religious group are “intrinsically and organically evil”—regardless of their
religious beliefs or practices—is racism, and an individual cannot avoid this
bias by converting to a different religion.
V. Where We’re Going: How Understanding the Racialization of American
Muslim Identity May Affect the Criminalization of that Identity
In Parts III and IV of this article, above, I have demonstrated that
American Muslim identity has been criminalized, and I have demonstrated
that American Muslim identity has been historically racialized—
specifically, as a non-white racial group. Moreover, I have briefly
discussed an almost undisputable reality of America’s racial history—that
non-white persons, due to their racial identity, are presumed to have an
inherent propensity for violence and criminality. But have I answered the
question of whether American Muslim identity, as one particular non-white
racial identity, has been criminalized because it has been racialized? Is this
even possible to prove? Moreover, why does it matter whether racialization
is the driving force behind this criminalization?
Now, in some ways it seems like it shouldn’t really matter whether the
criminalization of American Muslim identity is based upon “race” or
“religion.”
Because strict scrutiny applies either way—whether a
government is discriminating on the basis of race, or on the basis of
religion. So, if the same level of scrutiny applies regardless of which claim
is asserted, one could (wrongly) assume that the labeling of anti-Muslim
profiling as “racial” profiling has no legal, political, or strategic relevance.

57. George M. Fredrickson, Racism: A Short History 19 (Princeton Univ. Press 2002).
58. I would qualify this “actual or perceived” language to assert that a bias predicated
upon perceptions of religious beliefs and practices could still be classified as “racism” if
those perceptions themselves assume an “intrinsic [ ] and organic [ ] evil.” For example,
consider the typical non-Muslim American’s understanding of the religious belief “jihad”
and the perceptions of religious behaviors which accompany this religious belief. If one
assumes that a religious belief in “jihad” is synonymous violence and world domination,
then that assumption may be based upon a belief that Muslims are “intrinsically and
organically evil.”
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However, the error in such an assumption is that the assumption itself
ignores a certain psychosocial reality of American culture: Americans
simply view racial discrimination as a more sinister, more egregious form
of hate. Therefore, I would posit to you that it does matter whether
American Muslims are being criminalized as a “race” or as a result of their
“religion.” Because, as Americans, we do have an innate sense that
discriminating against somebody for an immutable characteristic which
they cannot change is just morally reprehensible. Even more precisely, we
have a racial history that causes us to believe that governmental
discrimination on the basis of “race” is more socially deplorable than other
forms of discrimination on other bases. In contrast, discrimination based
upon mutable characteristics, such as an individual’s beliefs (thoughts) or
practices (actions) remains much more socially acceptable that
discrimination based upon immutable characteristics such as race, ethnicity,
and national origin.
This socialized distinction between racial and religious discrimination
has been incorporated into the language of certain governmental policies.
For example, two of the FBI’s internal operating guidelines draw this very
distinction. Both the “Attorney General’s Guidelines for Domestic FBI
Operations”59 and the “Guidance Regarding the Use of Race by Federal
Law Enforcement Agencies,”60 prohibit the use of race, ethnicity, or
national origin, as an ex ante basis for prediction criminality. However,
both guidelines, through their explicit silence on the matter, permit the use
of religion (practices and beliefs) to determine and predict criminality.
Such a distinction suggests a social awareness on the part of the FBI and an
implicit acknowledgement that actions perceived as “racial profiling” are
not well accepted by the American public—and may even suggest that the
FBI itself, its decision-makers, share this cultural value. Either way, the
FBI’s distinction certainly appears as an attempt to reconcile official policy
with American cultural values toward discrimination on the basis of “race.”
If the FBI is ambivalent, or even uncertain, as to whether “Muslim”
identity is and should be considered a “racial” identity, it is not alone.
Following the symposium at which the research for this article was initially
presented, scores of American lives were lost (or inalterably changed)
59. See Memorandum from Michael Mukasey, Attorney Gen., to the Heads of Dep’t
Components 2 (Sept. 28, 2008), available at http://www.justice.gov/ag/readingroom/
guidelines.pdf.
60. See Dep’t of Guidance Regarding Use of Race by Federal Law Enforcement
Agencies (Jan. 2003), available at http://www.justice.gov/crt/about/spl/documents/guidance
_on_race.pdf.
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during a terrorist attack on the City of Boston.61 As we know now, the
perpetrators of that attack were American Muslims who had born in a
Muslim-majority region in Caucasus mountains, immigrated to the United
States lawfully, and who identified as American Muslims. However, before
the suspects had been publicly identified, a journalist published an article
titled “Let’s Hope the Boston Marathon Bomber is a White American.”62
The article drew sharp criticism and its author was accused of “playing the
race card.”63 At the heart of this criticism was an implied suggestion that
those who categorize the criminalization of American Muslim identity as
the criminalization of a racial (as opposed to religious) identity are trying to
play into American sympathies—our general disdain for racial profiling—
and are opportunistically using a dishonest labeling practice in order to do
so.64 In response to this criticism, another author published an article,65
which cited many of the cases cited herein, and asserted that the labeling of
Muslim identity as a racial (or racialized) identity is not dishonest and is
consistent with the historic racialization of American Muslim identity.
Moreover, the response article cited specific case law in support of its
thesis, thereby demonstrating that American Muslim identity has legally
been defined as a racial category consistently throughout the history of the
United States. This citation of legal precedent gives enhanced credence to
the prior author’s analysis of the laws and policies which have been
applied, almost exclusively, to American Muslim identity in the post-9/11
era.
Moving forward, as we think about how to effectively argue on behalf
of American Muslim civil rights, these two articles—written by columnists,
61. See Boston Marathon bombings, WIKIPEDIA.ORG, (Oct. 11, 2013, 7:03 PM),
www.en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Boston_Marathon_bombings (describing bombs that exploded
at the April 15, 2013 Boston Marathon, “killing 3 people and injuring an estimated 264
others”).
62. David Sirota, Let’s hope the Boston Marathon bomber is a white American, SALON
(Oct. 11, 2013, 10:58 PM), http://www.salon.com/2013/04/16/lets_hope_the_boston
_marathon_bomber_is_a_white_american/.
63. See Greg Pollowitz, David Sirota, Salon, and White Privilege, NAT’L REV. ONLINE
MEDIA BLOG (Oct. 11, 2013, 7:48 PM), http://www.nationalreview.com/mediablog/345855/david-sirota-salon-and-white-privilege.
64. Id. (noting that the article does display a more nuanced understanding of “Muslim”
as a racial, or racialized, group identity and distinguished between what Sirota calls “white
non-Islamic terrorists” and “non-white or developing-world terroris[ts]”).
65. See Peter Beinart, Are the Tsarnaevs White?, THE DAILY BEAST (Apr. 24, 2013),
http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2013/04/24/are-the-tsarnaevs-white.html) (last visited
Oct. 11, 2013) (implying that those who identity the Boston Marathon bombing as a
racialized criminalization are attempting to play into American sympathies).
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not lawyers—are somewhat instructive. Many organizations which
advocate for American Muslim civil rights, much like the first author,
boldly assert that the criminalization of American Muslim identity is a form
of “racial profiling” and that all anti-Muslim bias is racial bias—without
providing any data or research to support this assertion. As reaction to the
“Let’s Hope the Boston Marathon Bombers Are White” article
demonstrates, this strategy is ineffective if it contains no data or research to
support the assertion. For example, when attorneys have made this same
unsupported assertion in legal proceedings, they have been unsuccessful.66
A more effective strategy would follow the example of the second author
who wrote the “Are the Tsarnaevs White?” article. I would still encourage
advocates for American Muslim legal equality to argue the impropriety of
using Muslim identity as an ex ante basis for determining criminal
suspicion. However, and this is important, I would assert that it is an
ineffective strategy to simply label the criminalization of Muslim identity as
a form of racial profiling and to assume that your target audience agrees
that this label is accurate and appropriate. Instead, I would argue that we
will need to justify our use of this label in every instance in which we use
the label. Only then can we change the way in which our target audiences
are able to see the criminalization of American Muslim identity (i.e., the
presumption of an inherent propensity for violence and criminality) in the
proper light.
Thank you for your time, everybody.

66. Abdallah v. Allegheny Valley Sch., 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10667 (E.D. Pa. 2011)
(denying plaintiff’s assertion that his Muslim identity was a racial identity and reasoning
that: “While a court will accept well-pled allegations as true for the purposes of the motion,
it will not accept bald assertions, unsupported conclusions, unwarranted inferences, or
sweeping legal conclusions cast in the form of factual allegations” (citing Morse v. Lower
Merion Sch. Dist., 132 F.3d 902, 906 (3d Cir. 1997))) (emphasis added).

